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INTRODUCTION

In 2002, in the landmark case of Atkins v. Virginia,1 the Supreme
Court of the United States held, in a 6-3 majority, that the execution of a
defendant with mental retardation was considered to be a violation of the
Eighth Amendment.2 The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment, which led to the Court’s ruling that the execution of a defendant
with an intellectual disability was unconstitutional.3 In order to make this
decision, the Court had to determine how to differentiate between a
defendant with normal intellectual functioning and one with a significant
intellectual disability.4 The Court utilized a few psychological resources,
including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”
or “Manual”) IV-TR, to determine what criterion was necessary to qualify a
person as having mental retardation.5 By citing the definition of mental
retardation from the DSM in their decision, the Court acknowledged that the
Manual has an important legal use;6 this would later influence many states to
use it in the creation of their own legislation.7
In May of 2013, a fifth edition of the DSM was released.8 In this
new edition, several revisions were made to mental retardation that are
different from the information provided in the DSM-IV-TR, which was the
current edition during the Atkins decision.9 The changes made include a
name change from mental retardation to intellectual disability, as well as a
change in the criterion used to make a clinical diagnosis.10 The diagnostic
1.
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2.
Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing
Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and
Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 812
(2007); Joanna Hall, Comment, Atkins v. Virginia: National Consensus or Six-Person
Opinion?, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 361, 362 (2004).
3.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Hall, supra note 2, at 362.
4.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308–09.
5.
See id. at 308 n.3; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR:
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxix, 41 (4th ed., text rev.
2000) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR].
6.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
7.
Benjamin J. Clark, Comment, America’s Evolving Stance on Mental
Retardation and the Death Penalty, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 121, 137 (2003).
8.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5];
Timeline, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/about/pages/timeline.aspx (last
visited Feb. 16, 2014).
9.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra
note 8, at 33; Intellectual Disability, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/
Documents/Intellectual%20Disability%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
10.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33.
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criteria in the new edition moves away from the prior focus on the
Intelligence Quotient (“IQ”) score—an objective standard—to a
concentration on a measure of the person’s adaptive functioning, which is a
more subjective measure.11 These changes, which create a greater overall
subjective standard for a diagnosis of intellectual disability, differ from those
in place when the Atkins decision was made.12
With the newly released DSM-5 starting to be used by mental health
professionals, the definition in operation for intellectual disability will now
be different from that in place when the Atkins case was decided;13 this
change will inevitably have an impact in the legal field for criminal cases
with defendants that have intellectual disabilities.14 This article will first
discuss the facts of the Atkins case, as well as background information about
mental retardation and the death penalty, the DSM, and the specific
diagnostic standards for mental retardation that were current at the time of
the Atkins decision.15 This section will provide the history and details of the
Atkins case, as well as an explanation of the final holding of the Court.16 The
third section will note the relevant revisions made in the DSM-5 with the
shift from mental retardation to intellectual disability.17 The final section
will analyze the differences between the DSM-IV-TR and the DSM-5.18
This discussion will be an attempt to predict the inevitable impact that the
changes in the new edition of DSM will have on the legal system when
courts are presented with mentally retarded defendants that face capital
punishment; the diagnostic criteria used by professionals to assess the patient
and determine a diagnosis will no longer match up with the law in most
states.19 Additionally, the final section will hypothesize solutions to the
problems that may be created by the revisions.20

11.
12.
note 8, at 33.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY

The history of mental retardation and the death penalty is a relatively
simple and straightforward one.21 Evidence of the relationship between the
two can be seen dating back as early as the late 1700s when a person that
was deemed by the court to be an idiot “was not subject to criminal
liability.”22 By today’s standards, an idiot would be a person with severe or
profound mental retardation.23 More recently, the Supreme Court of the
United States heard the case of Godfrey v. Georgia24 in 1980.25 In this case,
the Court “discussed the necessity of finding that a defendant has [a] higher
moral culpability than an average criminal in order for the death penalty to
be imposed.”26 The holding of this case will prove to be particularly
important for future defendants with mental impairments when capital
punishment is under consideration; their level of culpability is a factor that
will be assessed by the courts as a determination of whether this punishment
is appropriate.27
Nine years later, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari and heard the case of Penry v. Lynaugh28 in 1989; this was the first
time the Court would address the issue of execution of a mentally retarded
defendant.29 In this case, Johnny Paul Penry was sentenced to death after he
confessed to the rape and murder of Pamela Carpenter.30 In state court, a
clinical psychologist testified that Penry had mild to moderate mental
retardation and an IQ score between fifty and sixty-three.31 Despite this, the
jury found Penry competent to stand trial.32 The result of the trial was that
“[t]he jury rejected Penry’s insanity defense and found him guilty of capital
murder.”33

21.
See James W. Ellis, Disability Advocacy and the Death Penalty: The
Road from Penry to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 173, 173 (2003).
22.
Lyn Entzeroth, Constitutional Prohibition on the Execution of the
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant, 38 TULSA L. REV. 299, 307 (2002).
23.
Id. at 308.
24.
446 U.S. 420 (1980).
25.
Id. at 420.
26.
Änna M. Hagstrom, Atkins v. Virginia: An Empty Holding Devoid of
Justice for the Mentally Retarded, 27 LAW & INEQ. 241, 248 (2009).
27.
See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 43233; Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 248.
28.
492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
29.
Ellis, supra note 21, at 174.
30.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
31.
Id. at 307–08.
32.
Id. at 308.
33.
Id. at 310.
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In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States
specifically addressed the question of whether “it [is] cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment to execute a mentally retarded
person.”34 The result of this case was that the Court failed to find an Eighth
Amendment violation and stated that mental retardation should be viewed
only as a mitigating factor when considering sentencing.35 The Court also
stated that “[w]hile a national consensus against [the] execution of the
mentally retarded may someday emerge . . . there is insufficient evidence of
such a consensus today.”36 Despite the holding, after the Penry decision,
eighteen states enacted legislation granting categorical exemption to any
mentally retarded defendant from the death penalty.37
A.

A Brief History of the Death Penalty

Prior to Penry, in 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States
heard the case of Furman v. Georgia38 and held that in its current use, the
death penalty—also referred to as capital punishment—violated the Eighth
Amendment.39 In this case, three black men had each been accused of the
rape or murder of a woman and for this, they faced the death penalty.40 The
Eighth Amendment “bans the use of cruel and unusual punishment.”41
Specifically, the Eighth Amendment reads, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”42 In writing this amendment, the Framers of the Constitution were
aiming to prevent methods of punishment that would be equivalent to
torture.43 In their decision, the Supreme Court Justices had different
opinions and reasoning behind their choice of whether or not the death
penalty was unconstitutional per se, but did agree on the final holding that
the death penalty in its current form was cruel and unusual punishment.44
However, in 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States heard the
case that established the death penalty could be reinstated and was not

34.
Id. at 313.
35.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
36.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 340 (emphasis added).
37.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 812.
38.
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
39.
Id. at 239–40; Amanda M. Raines, Note, Prohibiting the Execution of the
Mentally Retarded, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 171, 177–78 (2002).
40.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239, 252–53 (Douglas, J., concurring).
41.
Raines, supra note 39, at 177.
42.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
43.
Raines, supra note 39, at 177.
44.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40; Raines, supra note 39, at 178.
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entirely unconstitutional.45 Gregg v. Georgia46 presented a case in which the
defendant committed armed robbery and murder; he sought to challenge the
constitutionality of his death sentence.47 The Court held that, as a penalty for
murder, the death penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment.48 “[T]he
goals of retribution and deterrence of capital crimes may be permissible” as
factors to be considered when making the determination of “‘whether the
death penalty should [or should not] be imposed.’”49 Simply put, to satisfy
the goal of retribution, the Court must determine if the crime committed is
serious enough to deserve the punishment.50 To make this determination, it
is important to note, “the punishment of death is sufficiently related to an
individual’s personal culpability.”51 Essentially, the levels of culpability of
the offender and severity of the punishment must match.52 The theory of
deterrence is based upon the idea that punishment would inhibit a criminal
from engaging in that particular behavior; capital punishment can only be
considered a deterrent if the murder is premeditated and deliberate.53 The
reason behind that is the cause and effect relationship between the crime and
the punishment.54 In making its decision, the Court noted that the
punishment of death could not be said to be disproportionate to the crime of
murder, in which another life is intentionally taken.55 Despite this holding,
opponents to the death penalty still believe that it should be abolished
completely for all offenders.56

45.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); Kelly Christine Elmore,
Note, Atkins v. Virginia: Death Penalty for the Mentally Retarded—Cruel and Unusual—the
Crime, Not the Punishment, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285, 1295 (2004).
46.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
47.
Id. at 158, 162.
48.
Id. at 207; Elmore, supra note 45, at 1295.
49.
Holly T. Sharp, Determining Mental Retardation in Capital Defendants:
Using a Strict IQ Cut-Off Number Will Allow the Execution of Many That Atkins Intended to
Spare, 12 JONES L. REV. 227, 229–30 (2008); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
50.
J. Amy Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion: How to Achieve the
Categorical Exemption of Mentally Retarded Defendants from Execution, 45 U. RICH. L. REV.
961, 970 (2011).
51.
Hall, supra note 2, at 376.
52.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 247.
53.
Hall, supra note 2, at 377.
54.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 247.
55.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
56.
Sharp, supra note 49, at 232.
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The Atkins Case

In 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in
the case of Atkins v. Virginia, a criminal case of murder from 1996.57 In this
case, the defendant, Daryl Renard Atkins, was convicted of abducting Eric
Nesbitt, robbing him of the money that he had with him, as well as forcing
him to make a cash withdrawal from an automated teller machine.58 That
evening, William Jones was also present and participated in the abduction
and robbery.59 Later on, Atkins and Jones, who had both been armed with
semiautomatic handguns the entire time, took Nesbitt to a remote location to
shoot him eight times, which resulted in his death.60
“Initially, both Jones and Atkins were indicted [under a] capital
murder” charge for what happened to Nesbitt.61 However, Jones made a deal
to plead guilty to first-degree murder in return for a full testimony against
Atkins; this gave him the sentence of life imprisonment and made it no
longer possible for him to receive the death penalty.62 During Atkins’ trial,
his and Jones’ stories matched up substantially with the exception as to who
actually took the shots resulting in Nesbitt’s death.63 As Jones did not have
any sort of mental deficiency, his testimony was clearer and seemingly more
credible to the jury than that of Atkins; Jones’ clear testimony provided the
jury with sufficient evidence of Atkins’ guilt.64
In the penalty phase of the trial, Dr. Evan Nelson, a forensic
psychologist, testified for the defense about his pre-trial evaluation of
Atkins.65 Taking into consideration “interviews with people who knew
Atkins, a review of school and court records, and the administration of a
standard intelligence test which indicated that Atkins had a full scale IQ of
[fifty-nine],” Dr. Nelson stated that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded and
had been consistently throughout his life.66 Despite this finding provided by
Dr. Nelson, the jury sentenced Atkins to death.67 After a second sentencing
hearing due to a misleading verdict form, the jury rendered the same
verdict.68 With influence from the dramatic shift made in state legislation in
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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favor of protecting mentally retarded defendants that had occurred since the
Penry decision, as well as the severe opinion of the dissenters, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari as that someday mentioned in
the Penry decision had finally arrived, and it was time to review the
relationship between mentally retarded criminal offenders and the death
penalty.69
C.

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

While reviewing the facts of the case in order to reach a decision, the
Court used two similar psychological definitions to clearly understand Dr.
Nelson’s diagnosis that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded.70 While
multiple sources for a definition exist, the Court chose to use the DSM-IVTR and the similar definition of the American Association of Mental
Retardation (“AAMR”).71 These definitions may differ in language, but
offer the same conceptual information as to how to reach a diagnosis.72
Specifically, the DSM is a diagnostic manual created by the American
Psychiatric Association that classifies each type of mental disorder and
provides diagnostic criteria to be used for a diagnosis.73 The DSM is
particularly important, as it is the manual used by mental health professionals
to make a diagnosis for a patient.74 Psychologists and psychiatrists—and
their work—are important in the legal arena, as they serve as expert
witnesses in cases where the defendant’s mental health is called into
question.75
In the United States, the DSM is the primary tool used for mental
health professionals to make their diagnoses.76 The DSM uses a multiaxial
system, which assesses an individual on five different axes.77 These axes
each refer to a different area of information about that person, which helps
the clinician in creating a comprehensive evaluation of the person.78 This
system also contributes to a convenient format that allows the universal
69.
Id. at 307; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
70.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 & n.3.
71.
Id. at 308 n.3.
72.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 819.
73.
John A. Zervopoulos, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM): An Overview, in 2 EXPERT WITNESS MANUAL 1, 3 (1999); AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxiii.
74.
Zervopoulos, supra note 73, at 3.
75.
See id. at 2.
76.
Id. at 3.
77.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 27.
78.
Id.
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understanding of the diagnosis.79 In addition to diagnosis, the DSM also
serves as a tool to develop treatment plans and anticipate treatment
outcomes.80 DSM is so widely accepted that it is also used by the insurance
industry to determine appropriate reimbursements for psychological
treatments.81
As noted, psychologists and psychiatrists use the DSM in their
clinical practices to make diagnoses and can serve as expert witnesses in
death penalty cases involving potentially mentally retarded defendants.82
The expert must assess the defendant as they would if the defendant
individually sought their help in a private practice.83 Diagnosis is
particularly important for a mental health professional serving as an expert in
a capital case as their diagnosis will be determinative of the defendant’s fate;
it is a life or death determination.84 While it may not be a perfect forensic
tool and was not specifically designed for legal use,85 due to its importance
and overwhelming use in the mental health field, the Court chose to refer to
the DSM for information about the psychiatric diagnosis of mental
retardation.86 It has continued to be heavily relied upon for legal
determinations that involve some sort of mental impairment or dysfunction.87
DSM-IV-TR, the edition reviewed by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Atkins, does include a section in the introduction that
cautions about forensic usage of the Manual.88 It states “dangers arise
because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the
law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis.”89 It could be
argued that this warning is suggesting that mental health professionals should
limit their conduct to their own field of expertise as the DSM is intended for

79.
Id.
80.
Zervopoulos, supra note 73, at 4.
81.
Id.
82.
John Matthew Fabian et al., Life, Death, and IQ: It’s Much More than
Just a Score: Understanding and Utilizing Forensic Psychological and Neuropsychological
Evaluations in Atkins Intellectual Disability/Mental Retardation Cases, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
399, 403 (2011).
83.
See id.
84.
Id.
85.
See Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 265.
86.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002).
87.
Douglas A. Hass, Could the American Psychiatric Association Cause You
Headaches? The Dangerous Interaction Between the DSM-5 and Employment Law, 44 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 683, 692 (2013).
88.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra
note 5, at xxxii–xxxiii.
89.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxxiii.
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use of diagnosis in the mental health field and not for legal determinations.90
The addition of legal information into the DSM would prove to be more
problematic than helpful, which is why forensic additions have not been
included in new editions of the Manual.91 However, it is noted in the DSM
that with proper awareness of the risks and limitations, the DSM should
properly assist legal decision-makers in reaching their final conclusion.92
Despite the brief textual warning in the introduction that the DSM
should not be used for forensic purposes, as information may be
misrepresented, it is frequently used when law and psychology or psychiatry
intersect.93 “Courts, legislators, and government[al] agencies have relied on
the DSM[] as a persuasive” tool when making decisions in cases that involve
mental illness.94 For example, some state and federal statutes make use of
DSM definitions of mental illness or diagnostic criteria.95 Some states make
specific mention of the DSM while others just use the language found in it.96
The DSM is cited over 5500 times in court opinions, including other death
penalty cases.97 Courts have also referred to the DSM with the use of highly
respectful terms in several decisions.98 It is clear that the DSM has played an
important role in the legal world—through the development of legislation
and decisions made in the courtroom—and it will continue to do so.99
1.

Mental Retardation

As stated, the edition of the DSM that was current and in use during
Atkins was the DSM-IV-TR, which is a textual revision of the fourth
edition.100
According to the DSM-IV-TR, mental retardation “is
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning—an IQ of
approximately [seventy] or below—with onset before age [eighteen] years

90.
Id.; Daniel W. Shuman, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders in the Courts, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 25, 26 (1989).
91.
See Shuman, supra note 90, at 26–27; Ralph Slovenko, Editorial, The
DSM in Litigation and Legislation, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 6, 6 (2011).
92.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxxiii.
93.
Slovenko, supra note 91, at 6.
94.
Hass, supra note 87, at 692.
95.
Cia Bearden, Comment, The Reality of the DSM in the Legal Arena: A
Proposition for Curtailing Undesired Consequences of an Imperfect Tool, 13 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79, 80 (2012).
96.
Id. at 97–98.
97.
Slovenko, supra note 91, at 6, 8.
98.
Hass, supra note 87, at 692.
99.
See Slovenko, supra note 91, at 11.
100.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002); AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxix.
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and concurrent deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning.”101 At the
time of publication, the prevalence rate of mental retardation was estimated
to be one percent of the population.102 The estimated number of incarcerated
offenders is two percent to twenty-five percent.103 Between four percent and
twenty percent of the offenders currently on death row are estimated to be
mentally retarded; of the three thousand five hundred, this comes out to
about one hundred forty to seven hundred people.104 This is a significant
number of people, which stresses why diagnosis is so important and will
impact the implementation of the Atkins holding; it could result in pardons
from the death penalty.105
The DSM-IV-TR defines the diagnostic features of mental
retardation as including three necessary criterions.106
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in
at least two of the following skill areas: [C]ommunication, selfcare, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community
resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age
[eighteen] years (Criterion C).107

Each of the three diagnostic criterions is equally as important; all are
necessary for a person to receive a diagnosis of mental retardation and one
cannot be omitted.108 For example, even if an individual has an IQ score
lower than seventy, a diagnosis cannot be made if there is no impairment in
adaptive functioning.109 Per Criterion B, adaptive functioning is defined as
“how effectively individuals cope with common life demands and how well
they meet the standards of personal independence expected of someone in
their particular age group, sociocultural background, and community
setting.”110 This serves as a protection to ensure that the person is not just a

101.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 39.
102.
Id. at 46.
103.
Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded
Offenders and Excluding Them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 86 (2003–2004).
104.
Id.
105.
Id. at 85–86.
106.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41.
107.
Id.
108.
See id. at 41–42, 47.
109.
Id. at 42.
110.
Id.
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bad test-taker.111 Adaptive functioning includes “self-direction, functioning
academic skills, work, leisure, health, safety, personal hygiene, self-control,
and aspects of unmanageable behavior” which are each taken into account
when a determination for adaptive functioning is made.112 Any third-party
contacts need to be carefully and thoroughly questioned about the individual
in order for an accurate evaluation of adaptive functioning to be made.113
Assessments do exist, but this type of determination is not one that is easily
assessed by a standardized test.114
The third and final prong, that is equally as important for diagnosis,
is that mental retardation exists and will present itself in childhood.115
Criterion C sets the specification that the person must show signs of
cognitive impairment before the age of eighteen.116 What this means is that a
person with seemingly normal cognitive function cannot unexpectedly
become mentally retarded as an adult.117 This criterion is also in place to
help clinicians with differential diagnosis; this allows them to distinguish
between mental retardation and other intellectual deficits that can be
acquired later in life due to a dramatic change such as brain trauma or
disease.118 Additionally, while a mentally retarded person can be taught
certain skills that can help them function in society in a more normal way,
they can never be fully cured with therapy; this is a chronic condition.119
When Criterion C is evaluated along with the first two criterions, if a
diagnosis of mental retardation is made, it can be sure that it is one that
would reflect the person as a whole including their psychosocial and
cognitive functioning.120
A diagnosis of mental retardation is further divided into four varying
degrees of severity: Mild, moderate, severe, and profound.121 The degree of
severity that is most questioned in a legal setting, particularly in Atkins cases,
is the lowest level—mild mental retardation—which is defined as having an

111.
JAMES R. EISENBERG, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND DEATH PENALTY
LITIGATION 113 (2004).
112.
Id. at 113–14.
113.
Id. at 113.
114.
See id.; Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 846–47.
115.
Raines, supra note 39, at 176.
116.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41.
117.
Raines, supra note 39, at 176.
118.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 854.
119.
Raines, supra note 39, at 176.
120.
EISENBERG, supra note 111, at 114; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IVTR, supra note 5, at 41.
121.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 39.
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“IQ level [fifty to fifty-five] to approximately [seventy].”122 Why is that? It
is because this group is the closest or borderline to the level of normal
cognitive functioning.123 This group, mild mental retardation, is the largest
group consisting of approximately eighty-five percent of those who have
mental retardation.124 They are described as having the “social and
vocational skills adequate for minimum self-support.”125 Those with this low
degree of severity should live successfully in a community setting either on
their own or under supervision.126
2.

Intelligence Quotient

For Criterion A of a mental retardation diagnosis, general intellectual
functioning is measured and classified by an IQ score.127 In order to assess
subaverage intellectual functioning, it is necessary to implement an
intelligence test.128 Several IQ tests exist and are used in psychometric
testing, so a single individual may have multiple true IQ scores based upon
their performance on each test they have taken.129 The standard and most
frequently used tests are the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test, 3rd edition
(“WAIS-III”) and the Standford-Binet.130 These assessments are designed to
measure a person’s general intelligence score by assessing a broad range of
skills that produce a final numerical score that correlates to his or her level of
mental functioning.131
This score, as it is assessed through the psychometric measures, is an
objective measure of a person’s cognitive performance.132 The person’s raw
122.
Id. at 42; see Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 825; Frank M.
Gresham, Interpretation of Intelligence Test Scores in Atkins Cases: Conceptual and
Psychometric Issues, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 91, 92 (2009).
123.
See Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 88.
124.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 43.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
Id. at 41.
128.
David L. Rumley, Comment, A License to Kill: The Categorical
Exemption of the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1299, 1315–
17 (1993); Sharp, supra note 49, at 231.
129.
Gresham, supra note 122, at 93.
130.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 826; Alexis Krulish Dowling,
Comment, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court’s Ban on Executing the
Mentally Retarded, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 773, 798 (2003); Penny J. White, Symposium,
Treated Differently in Life But Not in Death: The Execution of the Intellectually Disabled
After Atkins v. Virginia, 76 TENN. L. REV. 685, 692 (2009).
131.
Dowling, supra note 130, at 798; see also White, supra note 130, at 692–
93.
132.
See Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 95.
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score is compared to a norm that is predetermined to reach his or her result
IQ score.133 It is important for the courts to be vigilant as to which test was
administered to the defendant and how that particular test is to be interpreted,
as norms for each assessment differ.134 The result—the IQ score—and the
person’s performance on these tests are interpreted to determine if a
defendant has a mental deficiency and, if so, what degree of mental
retardation.135 In general, an IQ score of seventy or below must be obtained
in order to receive a diagnosis of mental retardation; the score serves as an
essential component in the defendant’s diagnosis.136 This score of seventy is
“two standard deviations below the mean” score of one hundred.137
However, it should be noted that in IQ assessment, “there is a measurement
error of approximately [five] points” depending on the testing instrument
used; due to this, mental retardation can also be found in individuals with IQ
scores from seventy to seventy-five that show the appropriate level of
adaptive behavior.138
a.

Potential Issues with IQ Scores

The IQ test, while it appears to be a convenient and relatively simple
tool, is deceiving, as it has been found to have flaws.139 In fact, it is often
referred to as an imperfect tool.140 There can be a discrepancy between what
the court believes an intelligence test measures and what it actually does
measure; the court and legal professionals are not trained in the
comprehension of psychometric measures.141 While these potential issues
are important to consider, reliance on the IQ score remains high, as it
remains heavily used and relied upon.142
One believed flaw of IQ tests is the Flynn Effect—the general
upward trend of IQ scores—which causes a need for the test norms to be
updated and recalculated so that the score can continue to provide an
accurate reflection of the actual IQ.143 James Flynn states that the mean IQ

133.
Dowling, supra note 130, at 798–99; Fabian et al., supra note 82, at 414;
see also Gresham, supra note 122, at 93.
134.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 825.
135.
See Gresham, supra note 122, at 92.
136.
Clark, supra note 7, at 137; Rumley, supra note 128, at 1317.
137.
Sharp, supra note 49 at 231.
138.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41–42.
139.
Rumley, supra note 128, at 1329.
140.
Id. at 1333–34.
141.
See Gresham, supra note 122, at 96.
142.
Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 95.
143.
Gresham, supra note 122, at 93.
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of Americans increases three points per decade and 0.3 points per year.144
Flynn also believes that intelligence of a single individual does not change,
but the norm changes over time; it could be said that the Flynn Effect has no
impact on death penalty cases as it only concerns norms.145 However, the
problem arises when the IQ assessment used produces scores that rely
entirely on comparison to the norms for their meaning.146 It has also been
found that individuals may score differently on an intelligence test depending
on which point in the norming cycle the person took the assessment.147 For
example, a person’s performance may result in a score in the mentally
retarded range in the beginning of the cycle of a certain assessment and in a
more borderline range at the end of the cycle of that same assessment.148
The other important discrepancy with IQ assessment scores is
practice effects, which is the theory that those with cognitive dysfunction are
often administered multiple tests throughout their lifetime and that causes
inflated IQ scores.149 Due to this, it is known that practice effects occur, and
scores can increase due to the repeated administration of the measures; a
useful rule of thumb is to only use each assessment once a year with an
individual to reduce this effect.150 It is important to note that the smaller the
time interval between administrations of the test, the larger the practice effect
can be.151 The specific outcome of practice effects can also vary; factors that
can alter the performance include “the person’s age, their learning ability and
the time interval between testing.”152 This effect becomes problematic when
a person shows an overall increase in their IQ score, but continues to display
the same deficits in their adaptive functioning.153
Additionally, race and socioeconomic background have also been
found to alter an individual’s IQ score.154 Another possible influence on IQ
score is that a defendant may be able to fake their mental retardation by
purposely doing poorly on an IQ test; the faking of a mental illness is known
as malingering.155 However, even if attempted, the faking of a low IQ score
is difficult to do, and the IQ score is not the only consideration in a
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 94.
Id.
EISENBERG, supra note 111, at 113.
Id.
Gresham, supra note 122, at 94–95.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 839; Gresham, supra note 122, at

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Gresham, supra note 122, at 95.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 839.
Id. at 840.
Sharp, supra note 49, at 243.
Id. at 245.

95.
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diagnosis.156 Despite the possibility that there may be some flaws in the IQ
testing system, the IQ score has remained an important factor in determining
the intellectual functioning of a person under the diagnostic criteria DSM-IV
as it is a more objective measure used by the mental health professional to
assess a person’s overall cognitive functioning; it has been continually used
in courts as well.157 Between adaptive functioning and IQ level, the
cognitive IQ tends to be the more stable of the two.158 However, some
believe the IQ score should not be the sole measure used to determine mental
retardation, and thus may not be suited for a legal use.159
3.

Adaptive Functioning

Criterion B describes a more subjective way of assessing the
intellectual functioning of an individual by means of their adaptive
functioning.160 This element, also referred to as adaptive behavior, includes
the mental health professional’s assessment of how much service or support
that a mentally retarded person needs.161 These limitations would affect the
individual’s daily life as well as any stressors in his or her daily life or
immediate environment.162 This measure is looking to “assess deficits in the
performance of adaptive behavioral skills, even more than in the acquisition
of such skills.”163 The reason that this measure is so subjective is that mental
health professionals must rely upon interviews and other information
collected from third parties to make their assessment.164 Other records, such
as those from school, medical professionals, employment, etc., are also
consulted, but those are also the result of a third party’s opinion or
interpretation.165 In addition, over two hundred instruments are available to
be used as a standardized assessment of adaptive behavior, but these
assessments face the same level of scrutiny as IQ assessments; the large
number of available tests shows the level of uncertainty as to what exactly is
to be tested to make the determination.166 Overall, this assessment is
156.
Id. at 246–47.
157.
See Gresham, supra note 122, at 93.
158.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 42.
159.
See Rumley, supra note 128, at 1333; Sharp, supra note 49, at 243.
160.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41–42; see also
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 849; White, supra note 130, at 699.
161.
White, supra note 130, at 699.
162.
Id. at 700.
163.
Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 96–97.
164.
White, supra note 130, at 700.
165.
Id.
166.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 846; see White, supra note 130, at
700.
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particularly important for individuals with mild mental retardation, as it may
be the determining factor in diagnosis when the IQ score is close to
borderline range.167
D.

The Atkins Decision

The Court, by making use of a clinical definition of mental
retardation, “put professional standards of measurement, assessment, and
diagnosis in the center of Atkins adjudications.”168 The decision in Atkins
creates law that is highly dependent on psychological determinations.169
With the use of the clinical definition of mental retardation and psychometric
measure of IQ score, the Court concluded that the death penalty is not an
appropriate punishment for a criminal defendant that is mentally retarded.170
The Court reasoned that the mentally retarded defendant was “categorically
less culpable than the average criminal.”171 The public consensus from the
consistency in direction of change shown by the states was also a
contributing factor to the decision.172 The Court noted that it was “not so
much the number of these states that is significant, but the consistency of the
direction of change.”173 While looking at this, the Court found that mentally
retarded defendants should be punished in some way, but the death sentence
is not appropriate due to their lower level of personal culpability.174
The Court also held that execution of a mentally retarded person
failed to meet either of the two goals of capital punishment, retribution or
deterrence.175 These societal functions that the death penalty is supposed to
accomplish are not obtained with mentally retarded defendants.176 The goal
of retribution cannot be met with those that have mental impairments as they
are held to have a lower level of culpability.177 Therefore, in order “to ensure
that only the most deserving of execution are put to death, an exclusion for
the mentally retarded is appropriate.”178 Deterrence is not met either due to
167.
168.
169.
170.

Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 847.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 813.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); Dillard, supra note 50, at

171.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; see Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315; Hall, supra note 2, at 370.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 250.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20; Sharp, supra note 49, at 234.
Clark, supra note 7, at 126.
Hall, supra note 2, at 376–77.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.

980.
(1980).
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the fact that the Court has held that a defendant with mental impairment
cannot make the appropriate connection between his or her impulsive
conduct—i.e. murder of another person—with the future punishment of
death due to the imposition of the death penalty.179 The inability to further
these two goals of the death penalty contributed to the Court’s decision to
provide a categorical exemption.180
A final consideration made by the Court was that mentally retarded
defendants face a higher possibility of wrongful execution.181 By nature of
their condition, mentally retarded defendants are at a disadvantage when it
comes to their defense.182 Mentally retarded defendants serve as poor
witnesses, do not serve as much help to their defense counsel, can get
confused easily, can appear to feel no remorse, and suffer other seemingly
negative results of their diminished capacity.183 In addition, mentally
retarded defendants have a much larger risk of making a false confession
than defendants with standard intellectual functioning.184 All of these factors
were considered and contributed to the Court’s decision that mentally
retarded defendants should belong to a categorical exemption and should not
face the death penalty.185
This decision is a unique one, as it expresses a constitutional rule
that is entirely dependent on a definition and diagnostic criteria from clinical
psychology.186 In this case, the Court established “a per se rule exempting
all persons with mental retardation from the death penalty based on diagnosis
alone.”187 The exemption includes all people with the diagnosis regardless of
what level of severity they are found to have.188 This makes the important
question to be answered in these types of cases to be whether or not the
defendant is mentally retarded; this is something that the Court disagreed on
how to determine and left this decision to the states.189 The class that will
prove to be the most difficult to protect and have the most controversy is the
mildly mentally retarded as they come closest to the normal border range.190
179.
Dillard, supra note 50, at 971.
180.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Sharp, supra note 49, at 234.
181.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 252.
182.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 252.
183.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21; Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 252.
184.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 252.
185.
Id.
186.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 813.
187.
Id. at 814.
188.
Id. at 823.
189.
Id. at 815–16; Helen Shin, Note, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near?
The Impact of Atkins and Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally Ill
Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 479–80 (2007).
190.
See Gresham, supra note 122, at 92; Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 88.
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However, even with this decision, which essentially overrules Penry, the
death penalty remains an appropriate punishment “for a smaller, more
culpable class of defendants.”191
Justice Scalia makes an additional point about the purpose of the
death penalty in his dissent.192 An additional purpose of the death penalty is
to eliminate dangerous offenders; by doing this, the future crimes that they
may commit are effectively prevented.193 It is quite clear that this goal is
reached by the death penalty, as these offenders would no longer commit any
crimes.194 This, however, is a purpose that would be properly served
regardless of how high or low the offender’s IQ score is.195
1.

Determinations Left to the States

In making its decision, the Court neglected to implement a procedure
or designate a specific definition to be applied to determine if a defendant is
mentally retarded.196 By doing this, the Court left state lawmakers and
officials, and in a way, forensic psychologists or psychiatrists, the task of
determining how exactly to enact and properly implement their decision.197
The Court established some guidance by providing two similar definitions in
the cases that implement the same three main criteria for a diagnosis.198 It
could also be argued that the Court intended for the states to adopt one, or a
hybrid form of the two definitions cited in the decision, due to their
similarities.199 Its main determination was to justify the exemption of
mentally retarded defendants from the death penalty; the exact way to
enforce the exemption was not determined.200 Instead, the Court left this task
up to the states, as it had done in Ford v. Wainwright201 for the determination
of competency, and it became the task of the states to develop the
191.
White, supra note 130, at 687; see also Shin, supra note 189, at 481.
192.
Elmore, supra note 45, at 1330.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Dillard, supra note 50, at 969.
197.
Linda Knauss & Joshua Kutinsky, Into the Briar Patch: Ethical
Dilemmas Facing Psychologists Following Atkins v. Virginia, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 121, 121
(2004).
198.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 812–13, 819.
199.
Id. at 818–19.
200.
Dillard, supra note 50, at 979.
201.
477 U.S. 399 (1986). “[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits states from
carrying out the death penalty on defendants who are insane. . . . However, the Court left it to
the individual states to determine the definition of competence for execution and the
procedures they should use to assess whether a prisoner meets the standard [for] insanity.”
Shin, supra note 189, at 474.
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appropriate means of enforcement.202 Many states have chosen to use the
DSM-IV-TR as their guidelines for making the determination of whether or
not a defendant is mentally retarded.203 If a state were to fail to exclude the
mentally retarded from facing the death penalty, that state would be in direct
violation of the Eighth Amendment.204 Despite this, after the decision was
made, state courts that did not agree with the decision could potentially use
this freedom from the Court and lack of a uniform standard as a way to evade
the Atkins decision.205
The possibility of other complications arose for all states that
complied; for example, the differences and discrepancies between the states
allow for the possibility that one individual “could be found [to be] mentally
retarded in one state, but not . . . another.”206 It depends on the exact
language that was chosen by the state to be enacted in its legislation to
determine what constitutes mental retardation.207 Even without giving a
direct definition for mental retardation, some argue that the Court should
have advised that the states not place as much weight on IQ test scores as
they do.208 However, many states seem to agree that the IQ score cutoff is a
particularly important factor to include in their legislation.209 There are
significant differences amongst the states; some are strict on the IQ score
requirement, while others are more vague by only demanding subaverage
intellectual functioning.210
In addition to a definition, the Court also left it up to the states to
determine the specifics of the procedure, including determining who would
be the fact finder, at which stage the mental functioning of the defendant
should be assessed, and what the suitable burden of proof would be.211 For
example, a majority of states with judicial procedures in place have chosen to
make this determination prior to the start of trial.212 Some states give the
task of determining mental retardation to a jury, while others give it to a trial
judge.213 By neglecting to designate a specific definition and procedure to
202.
Ford, 477 U.S. at 416–17; Dillard, supra note 50, at 978.
203.
Clark, supra note 7, at 137.
204.
White, supra note 130, at 688.
205.
See John H. Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its
Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625, 626 (2009).
206.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 260.
207.
See id.
208.
Id. at 262–63, 265.
209.
Id. at 265.
210.
Paul S. Appelbaum, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: After
Atkins, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1295, 1296 (2009).
211.
Blume et al., supra note 205, at 626–27.
212.
Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 114.
213.
Dillard, supra note 50, at 966.
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follow, the Court allows for considerable differences to exist from state to
state.214 These inconsistencies and differences in procedure and definition
could cause contradictory rulings on whether or not a defendant has mental
retardation.215
2.

Other Issues in Applying the Decision

Several other points of ambiguity and perplexity came to light with
the Atkins decision, such as the fact that the Court created a categorical
exemption in the Atkins case.216 The use of this general categorization of
exemption for those with mental retardation eliminates the entire idea of
individual sentencing in our legal system as far as this specific group of
individuals is concerned; it separates those with mental retardation from
everyone else.217 Beyond the separation between those with normal
cognitive functioning and those with impairments, the categorization treats
all those with mental retardation the same without any sort of distinction
made for the varying degrees of mental retardation.218 This creates a level of
equality amongst those with the disorder while diagnosis makes a
differentiation.219
In neglecting to provide a uniform standard for mental retardation,
there is also an issue with IQ assessment.220 Multiple assessment tools exist
to make an assessment, but each has their own set of norms.221 The lack of
uniform testing requirements may be highly problematic.222 Without a set
rule as to which test to use, psychologists must be ethical in their
determination of which test to administer; they must administer a current
edition of an assessment that they have the appropriate level of proficiency to
administer.223 The presence of a uniform rule as to which test to use would
eliminate some of the possible errors and ethical violations that can
potentially occur.224 The uniform rule would have to be updated frequently
as these tests are often revised and the courts would have to use a current
test.225 However, on the other side, the benefits of uniformity could be
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
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Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 260.
Id. at 250; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
Elmore, supra note 45, at 1337.
Id.
See id.
Dowling, supra note 130, at 807.
See id. at 799–800.
See id. at 807.
See id. at 808.
See id. at 810.
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 828.
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outweighed by other disadvantages such as individualized selection for the
defendant and that the clinician should administer the test they feel most
competent using.226
Another important point is potential ethical dilemmas that will be
faced by the mental health professionals who will be assessing the specific
defendant.227 One of the main issues that will be faced by any forensic
psychologist is that they have the potential to do harm to their client;
psychologists, under their ethics code, are not to do any harm to their
clients.228 Additionally, these psychologists must be sure to go into their
assessment of the defendant without any sort of preconceived thoughts about
the crime on trial or what the outcome should be.229 Psychologists have to be
mindful of any possible factor that may cause an unfair or incorrect result on
the IQ assessment and properly account for these potential issues in their
determination and assessment.230 The psychologists in these cases are faced
with several potential ethical issues that they must avoid while trying to
generate the most honest and truthful assessment that they can.231
3.

Cases Since Atkins

In the time since the Atkins decision, many courts have encountered
cases with mentally retarded defendants.232 However, the floodgates did not
open for this type of litigation as was feared in the dissent by Justice Scalia;
there has not been a complete overflow of claims by criminal offenders
claiming to have mental retardation.233 Research shows that of the claims
made that have lost, most failed to prove either subaverage intellectual
functioning or significant limitations in adaptive functioning.234 Data also
shows that the Atkins decision has not been applied to the states in a uniform
way as could be expected from the differing legislation created by each
state.235
226.
Id.
227.
Knauss & Kutinsky, supra note 197, at 124.
228.
Id.
229.
Id. at 125.
230.
Id. at 128.
231.
See id. at 121–23.
232.
E.g., Jackson v. State, 963 So. 2d 150, 152 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); see
also Blume et al., supra note 205, at 625, 628, 630.
233.
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 353 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Blume et al., supra note 205, at 639.
234.
See Blume et al., supra note 205, at 629–30.
235.
Id. at 629, 639; Elizabeth Dilts, Lawyers Worry New Measure of Mental
Retardation Could Prompt More Executions, REUTERS LEGAL, May 13, 2013, available at
http://archive.is/ToBPv.
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In regard to intellectual functioning, or analysis of the IQ score, prior
clinical research suggests that this should be only “a gateway to a rigorous
assessment of adaptive functioning.”236 This is because it is believed that the
employment of a strict cut-off of a score of seventy may wrongly exclude
those who deserve protection under Atkins.237 In an analysis of multiple
jurisdictions with various IQ cutoff points, it was found that over sixty
percent of those who successfully prove intellectual impairment had no
reported IQ scores over the score of seventy; it is also noted that fifteen
percent of defendants that have been successful with their Atkins claim have
had IQ scores that exceed seventy.238 A small number of successful Atkins
claims involve defendants that have never scored below a seventy on any
intellectual assessment.239 However, there have also been cases with less
success that focus on IQ score; one example is a case in Texas, where a
defendant met the requirement of having an IQ below seventy, but was not
exempted from capital punishment.240
There have been almost one hundred cases since the ruling in Atkins
in which defendants with death penalty sentences have been reduced when
the courts found that they met the necessary requirements to prove they were
mentally retarded.241 This is an impressive statistic considering that between
1976 and 2002, prior to Atkins, there were at least forty-one defendants
executed who would have been found to be mentally retarded and could have
been exempted.242 However, it seems less impressive when it is stated that
only a quarter of the inmates that have claimed to be mentally retarded have
received a stay of execution since the Atkins holding.243 Data shows that
there have been varying levels of success for proving adaptive deficits;
depending on which skill set was chosen as the definition for mental
retardation, which includes several.244 There have also been very few cases
that lose solely on the third prong, which requires onset before the age of
236.
Blume et al., supra note 205, at 631.
237.
Id. at 631–32.
238.
Id. at 632.
239.
Id.
240.
Dilts, supra note 235.
241.
John Blume, Sentence Reversals in Intellectual Disability Cases:
Defendants Whose Death Sentences Have Been Reduced Because of a Finding of “Mental
Retardation” Since Atkins v. Virginia (2002), DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/sentence-reversals-intellectual-disability-cases (last updated July 19,
2012).
242.
List of Defendants with Mental Retardation Executed in the United States:
1976–2002, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/list-defendantsmental-retardation-executed-united-states (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
243.
Dilts, supra note 235.
244.
Blume et al., supra note 205, at 634.
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eighteen.245
Together, these results show the inconsistency of the
implementation of Atkins.246
III.

THE DSM-5

The latest edition of the Manual was released in late May of 2013.247
This edition has been a work in progress for fourteen years as its
development began immediately following the release of DSM-IV.248 DSM5 was developed in hope of addressing concerns that had existed with the
prior editions.249 It was also created in order to match up more closely with
the World Health Organization (“WHO”) and their International
Classification of Diseases (“ICD”) as well as other important leading health
organizations; this will provide for more uniform diagnoses in the health
system.250 The newest edition of the Manual features several differences
compared to prior editions, such as a different organizational layout and a
removal of the prior multi-axial system.251 In this edition, all mental
disorders are considered to be on a single axis and are therefore, given equal
weight; prior editions had five axes of unequal weight.252 It is also the first
edition not to make use of traditional Roman Numerals because this edition
is intended to be a living document.253 The believed explanation for this
change to Arabic Numeration is that when new evidence surfaces or changes
occur, the Manual can be changed online which will produce constant
revisions, which will produce more editions labeled with a decimal.254 That
is the hypothesis as to why the decision was made to use the regular
numerical display for this edition.255 Each change and revision was made
245.
Id. at 636.
246.
Id. at 639.
247.
Timeline, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/
Timeline.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
248.
Hass, supra note 87, at 699; Darrel A. Regier et al., Commentary, The
Conceptual Development of DSM-V, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 645, 646 (2009); Timeline, supra
note 247.
249.
Regier et al., supra note 248, at 646.
250.
Regier et al., supra note 248, at 647; Luis Salvador-Carulla et al.,
Intellectual Developmental Disorders: Towards a New Name, Definition and Framework for
“Mental Retardation/Intellectual Disability” in ICD-11, 10 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 175, 175
(2011); Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
251.
Jerome C. Wakefield, DSM-5:
An Overview of Changes and
Controversies, 41 CLINICAL SOC. WORK J. 139, 140 (2013); Intellectual Disability, supra note
9.
252.
Wakefield, supra note 251, at 142; Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
253.
Wakefield, supra note 251, at 140.
254.
Id.
255.
Id.
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carefully to improve the Manual and provide more effective treatment and
services.256
A.

Intellectual Disability (Intellectual Developmental Disorder)

The American Psychiatric Association states that “[t]he significant
changes [to intellectual disability] address what the disorder is called, its
impact on a person’s functioning, and criteria improvements to encourage
more comprehensive patient assessment.”257 In DSM-5, the first and most
noticeable difference to mental retardation is the name change; mental
retardation is now referred to as intellectual disability (intellectual
developmental disorder).258 “[T]he parenthetical name . . . is included in the
text to reflect deficits in cognitive capacity beginning in the developmental
period.”259
This change occurred for reasons including “policy,
administrative, and legislative purposes.”260 The new terms were carefully
selected to be widely used and understood261 as of when this name was
determined.262 The phrase intellectual disability is one that is commonly
used in the medical, educational, and other professional fields.263 This name
change will allow for a more universal understanding of what exactly the
disability is.264
In addition to the name change, the fifth edition emphasizes adaptive
functioning of the individual as opposed to the more heavy reliance on the IQ
score that is seen in DSM-IV-TR.265
DSM-5 emphasizes the need to use both clinical assessment and
standardized testing of intelligence when diagnosing intellectual
disability, with the severity of impairment based on adaptive
functioning rather than IQ test scores alone. By removing IQ test
scores from the diagnostic criteria, but still including them in the
text description of intellectual disability, DSM-5 ensures that they
are not overemphasized as the defining factor of a person’s overall

256.
Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
257.
Id.
258.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33; Intellectual
Disability, supra note 9.
259.
Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
260.
Salvador-Carulla et al., supra note 250, at 175.
261.
Id. at 176–77.
262.
Id. at 177.
263.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33.
264.
See id.
265.
Wakefield, supra note 251, at 143.
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ability, without adequately considering functioning levels. This is
especially important in forensic cases.266

Furthermore, the specification that the disability must be present
prior to the age of eighteen is removed and replaced with a more generalized
categorization of beginning in the developmental stage.267 This edition does
have some consistency with the prior edition as it states that the prevalence
rate of intellectual disability remains at one percent of the population268 and
still makes use of the four specifications for the degrees of intellectual
disability: Mild, moderate, severe, and profound.269 However, these degrees
of severity are now “defined on the basis of adaptive function[], and not IQ
scores” as it is the level of adaptive functioning that determines the level of
support that will be required for each level of severity.270
1.

Diagnostic Features

DSM-5 defines intellectual disability as “a disorder with onset
during the developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive
functioning deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains.”271 In order
to receive this diagnosis, there are three criteria that must be met by the
individual, which was also true in the prior edition.272 In this edition, the
diagnostic features of intellectual disability are:
The essential features of intellectual disability
(intellectual developmental disorder) are deficits in general mental
abilities (Criterion A) and impairment in everyday adaptive
functioning, in comparison to an individual’s age-, gender-, and
socioculturally matched peers (Criterion B). Onset is during the
developmental period (Criterion C). The diagnosis of intellectual
disability is based on both clinical assessment and standardized
testing of intellectual and adaptive functions.273

266.
267.

Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41, with
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 38.
268.
Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 46, with
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 38.
269.
Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 42, with
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33.
270.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33.
271.
Id.
272.
Id.; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41.
273.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 37.
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In regard to Criterion A, this refers to intellectual functioning.274 To
meet this, there must be “[d]eficits in intellectual functions . . . confirmed
both by clinical assessment and individualized, standardized intelligence
testing.”275 This includes things such as abstract thinking, practical
understanding, planning, and problem solving.276 IQ scores are used to
determine part of this and are only approximations of the individual’s
intellectual functioning.277 Clinical judgment should always be used when
interpreting the results of an IQ assessment to determine the level of
intellectual function.278
Criterion B assesses “[d]eficits in adaptive functioning that result in
[the] failure to meet developmental and sociocultural standards for personal
independence and social responsibility.”279 Adaptive functioning is assessed
in two ways; it is done with both clinical evaluations as well as with the use
of individualized psychometric measures.280 “Without ongoing support, the
adaptive deficits limit functioning in one or more activities of daily life . . .
.”281 There are three domains that are assessed by this criterion: Conceptual,
social, and practical.282
The conceptual—academic—domain involves competence in
memory, language, reading, writing, math reasoning, acquisition
of practical knowledge, problem solving, and judgment in novel
situations, among others. The social domain involves awareness
of others’ thoughts, feelings, and experiences; empathy;
interpersonal communication skills; friendship abilities; and social
judgment, among others. The practical domain involves learning
and self-management across life settings, including personal care,
job responsibilities, money management, recreation, selfmanagement of behavior, and school and work task organization,
among others.283

This criterion is met when at least one of the domains of adaptive functioning
is sufficiently impaired.284 Sufficient impairment is when the person needs
continual support in order to perform that function adequately in at least one
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
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life setting.285 Additionally, these adaptive functioning deficits must be
directly related to the intellectual deficit assessed for Criterion A.286
The final necessity, Criterion C, is that “[o]nset of intellectual and
adaptive deficits [is] during the developmental period.”287 Specifically, the
phrase developmental period refers to either childhood or adolescence; there
is no specific numerical age assigned to this period of time.288 The removal
of the cut-off age of eighteen is a significant change as this new term allows
for more subjective discretion.289 The DSM-5 states that the time of onset
may vary from person to person as it is dependent upon the specific and
individualized level of brain dysfunction.290 In order to make a proper
diagnosis, Criterion C, as well as both Criterion A and B, must be met by the
individual either within their specific history or past presentations or their
current presentation; in other words, all three must be met in order for an
individual to receive this diagnosis.291 The intended purpose of all of these
revisions was to “help clinicians develop a fuller, more accurate picture of
patients, a critical step in providing them with” treatment personally tailored
to each specific individual which will make it as effective as possible.292
B.

Cautionary Statement for Forensic Use

In its first few pages, the DSM-5 offers a cautionary statement
towards its use in forensic settings;293 this warning receives much more
emphasis compared to prior editions as it receives its own full page and
separate heading.294 It warns that it has been designed to assist mental health
clinicians in their work such as with assessments, diagnosis of patients, and
treatment plans.295 The warning stresses that the definition in this edition
was not developed to meet the needs of legal professionals.296 However, the
statement also states that if used appropriately, the DSM-5 can serve as a
useful tool to assist those in the legal profession to make necessary decisions
by providing the necessary information for a legal decision maker to
285.
Id.
286.
Id.
287.
Id. at 33.
288.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 38.
289.
See id.
290.
Id.
291.
Id.
292.
Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
293.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 25.
294.
Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxxvii,
with AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 25.
295.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 25.
296.
Id.
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understand the specific characteristics of a certain mental disorder.297 An
important point, particularly when assessing mental retardation, is that the
DSM-5 provides “diagnostic information about the longitudinal course
[which] may improve decision making when the legal issue concerns [the]
individual’s mental functioning at a past or future point in time.”298
However, as with prior editions, this edition does stress that the
information within its pages poses a risk for misuse or misunderstanding.299
It is noted that there is an imperfect fit between the DSM-5 information for a
clinical diagnosis and “the questions of ultimate concern to the law.”300 It
also stresses the importance of only trained, mental health professionals
using the Manual for the diagnosis of mental disorders.301 Finally, the
warning concludes that while the DSM-5 could be a helpful tool in the legal
field when used appropriately, it is important to note that the meeting of all
criteria for a certain disorder does not demonstrate the person’s behavior in
the particular moment in question.302
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THESE CHANGES

As the DSM-5 has just been released, the direct result of the changes
remains to be seen, but it is inevitable that there will be ramifications
regarding the nation’s categorical ban of defendants with intellectual
disability from the death penalty.303 The now outdated DSM-IV-TR was
used as a guideline for many states when they created their legislation
regarding capital punishment for offenders with intellectual disability.304 As
mental retardation was revised to intellectual disability and the diagnostic
criteria has been revised, discrepancies and issues are likely to surface over
time in regard to the exact definition of intellectual disability for diagnosis.305
It will be important to deal with any issues quickly as this determination
could mean the difference between life and death for criminal defendants.306
The issues that will arise will be the direct result of the varying procedures
and definitions implemented by the each state’s legislation at the result of the
297.
Id.
298.
Id.
299.
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxxvii; AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 25.
300.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 25.
301.
Id.
302.
Id.
303.
See id. at 33; Dilts, supra note 235; Hass, supra note 87, at 684.
304.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxiii, 39; Clark,
supra note 7, at 137.
305.
Appelbaum, supra note 210, at 1296.
306.
Id.
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Atkins case and definition and diagnostic criteria for the psychological field
in the DSM-5.307 The importance and use of the DSM in fields outside of
psychology is often overlooked, as are the implications of revisions made to
the Manual.308
The IQ score is highly emphasized in many state definitions, but has
been removed from the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5.309 It can easily be
understood why it is hypothesized that this will cause confusion; a defendant
may meet the criterion for intellectual disability by an expert witness, but
may not meet the legislative standards for that state.310 The removal of the
focus on the objective assessment of an IQ score will inevitably cause
trouble in the courtroom as it “has traditionally been at the core of
diagnosing” intellectual disability.311 The focus for judges, attorneys, and
psychologists tends to remain on the IQ score.312 Even with the possible
negative effects, such as the Flynn Effect, the IQ score earned an important
spot in many state definitions.313 Variation did exist in the exact cut-off IQ
score used by states.314 For example, several states require an IQ below
sixty-five while others chose the traditional cut-off of seventy; however,
there are also states that chose not to identify a minimum IQ score in their
legislation.315 While it has been established that there are discrepancies
amongst the states as to how they define and implement their post-Atkins
procedures, regardless of their current system, problems are likely to arise.316
Most states modeled their current laws off of the clinical definition in the
DSM-IV-TR, that was current at the time of the Atkins decision, and made a
focus on the IQ score.317 With the revisions made to DSM-5, it is inevitable
that there are now differences between the state’s legal and new clinical
definition of intellectual disability.318 This will become problematic when
discrepancies exist between a diagnosis made by a testifying clinical forensic

307.
See id.
308.
See Hass, supra note 87, at 684.
309.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33; see Hagstrom,
supra note 26, at 265.
310.
See Appelbaum, supra note 210, at 1296.
311.
See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 825.
312.
Fabian et al., supra note 82, at 421.
313.
See Gresham, supra note 122, at 93; Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 90.
314.
Natalie Cheung, Note, Defining Intellectual Disability and Establishing a
Standard of Proof: Suggestions for a National Model Standard, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 317, 327
(2013).
315.
Dowling, supra note 130, at 78991.
316.
See Clark, supra note 7, at 136, 139; Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 114.
317.
Clark, supra note 7, at 137; see also Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 89.
318.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33; Clark, supra note 7,
at 137; Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 89.
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psychologist who focuses on adaptive behavior, but the state court is looking
for an IQ score to make their determination.319
The focus now, according to DSM-5, is more on adaptive
functioning.320 According to DSM-5, this is a positive change as the IQ
scores became less valid on the lower end of the range where mild
intellectual disability is located.321 A focus on IQ has also been found to lead
to problematic outcomes in forensic settings.322 “IQ scores are too unreliable
and too sensitive to external factors for courts to rely on when a person’s life
is at stake.”323 Additionally, the new edition of the Manual states that IQ
scores are only approximations of a person’s intellectual functioning and
may not be sufficient enough to assess their functioning in real life
situations.324 However, as mentioned, most states put emphasis on the IQ
score in their legislation—which is no longer relevant for diagnosis—and
less concentration on adaptive behavior.325
Another problematic function of this shift is that adaptive
functioning is almost entirely based on third party accounts; while
assessments do exist, that is not the type of behavior that is easily assessed
with standardized testing.326 When it comes to adaptive behavior, there is
more difficulty in measurement and presentation of conclusive evidence to
the fact finder in court.327 Therefore, even as the need for clinical judgment
in the diagnosis has always been significant, the role of the psychologists
will become even more important.328 Their clinical judgment will be relied
upon even further for the subjective assessment of adaptive behavior.329
Even though it may seem minor, the change of the onset from age
eighteen to during the developmental period is also a cause for concern.330
This diagnostic factor was in place to help clinicians rule out other possible
319.
Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 260.
320.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33; see also Intellectual
Disability, supra note 9.
321.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33.
322.
Wakefield, supra note 251, at 143.
323.
Sharp, supra note 49, at 247.
324.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 37.
For example, a person with an IQ score above seventy may have such severe
adaptive behavior problems in social judgment, social understanding, and other
areas of adaptive functioning that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to
that of individuals with a lower IQ score. Thus, clinical judgment is needed in
interpreting the results of IQ tests.
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diagnoses—such as brain injury—that can occur later in life.331 In the
alternative, it could provide protection for younger defendants who never
took an intellectual assessment when they were below the age of eighteen.332
While before the age of eighteen and during the developmental period are
intended to refer to the same time frame, the lack of a solid age cut-off may
allow more room for malingering.333 The age-of-onset criterion served as a
safeguard to keep a defendant from being able to feign an intellectual
disability, but with a less restrictive terminology now in place, this safeguard
may not be as strong.334
So, why is this important? Changes and complications are in store
for the legislation that requires use of the DSM, particularly Atkins cases.335
The exact result will be dependent on the state in which the trial is
occurring.336 The reasons for that are the varying definitions and procedures
in place in each state for dealing with capital punishment and intellectually
disabled criminal offenders.337 However, despite these differences, a strong
fear has developed among defense attorneys, as their hypothesis is that this
new edition will allow for more executions of those that Atkins sought to
protect.338
Death penalty lawyers fear that this revision will allow courts to
execute offenders with IQ scores below seventy more easily.339 Arguably,
this shift in focus can give states more room to subvert the decision made in
Atkins and allow the execution of a mentally retarded defendant in the mild
range.340 The determination of adaptive functioning is exceptionally more
subjective than an IQ score, which will undoubtedly allow for each side to
have an expert witness arguing the alternative opinions on the diagnosis.341
By replacing a diagnosis that requires one objective part and one subjective
part with a fully subjective assessment, it gives courts more room to avoid
following the Atkins decision if they so choose.342 Research has found that
jurors have stereotypes of how they believe intellectual disability should
manifest.343 If a jury is the fact finder, it is more likely for a person with
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
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mild mental retardation to be executed, as they are unlikely to meet the
standards of the stereotype; the jury may not accept the subjective
assessment by a psychological expert witness because they will realize there
is room for interpretation in the diagnosis.344 If the decision is for a judge to
make and the defendant falls into a gray area for diagnosis based on their
level of adaptive behavior, the judge has room to interpret the facts and use
his or her own discretion to make a decision;345 this is a cause for concern as
judges are not trained in this field.346 Defendants with IQ scores lower than
seventy have been executed in the past several years despite the Atkins
decision, and the DSM revision is highly likely to make this worse with the
change to more subjective diagnostic criterion.347
With a focus on adaptive function, this could lead to more
executions of those the Atkins holding was intended to protect.348 It is
believed that the removal of adaptive behavior from the requirements could
actually bar more executions than required by the Atkins decision.349 A focus
on this requirement of adaptive functioning allows for more erroneous
findings of intellectual disability.350 With adaptive function, the focus is
always on the weaknesses and never the strengths.351 If the focus were to
return to the IQ score, the reach of Atkins exemption could arguably be
expanded.352
The DSM work group defends their decision and states that they do
not agree with the fear of the defense attorneys.353 The American Psychiatric
Association is a large organization that represents thousands of psychiatric
professionals; its goal is for them to all work together and create the best
mental heath care possible.354 Additionally, the prior focus on IQ scores is
more likely to result in a mentally retarded defendant facing the death
penalty due to its inherent limitations.355 A single IQ point could be the
difference between life and death for an offender if additional clinical
interpretation and analysis is not considered.356 For example, in a stricter
344.
345.
346.
347.

Id. at 339, 342–43.
Fabian et al., supra note 82, at 421.
See id. at 401.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 37–38; Dilts, supra
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cut-off state, such as Kentucky, a defendant must have an IQ score of
seventy or lower in order to be considered to have an intellectual
disability.357 An IQ score does not allow a legal fact finder to see the whole
picture of who the defendant is and why they did what they did, but it does
give them a numerical value as a comparison to assess their intellectual
function, which makes their execution more likely.358 The DSM work group
believes that their revision should be helpful to the courts by shifting the
attention to adaptive behavior; this way, the courts can analyze the defendant
more thoroughly and make more accurate decisions about the defendant’s
mental abilities.359
If the DSM does have a negative impact and results in the death of
more mentally retarded defendants, this is a violation of the protection
ensured to mentally retarded offenders by the Atkins decision.360 That
holding was intended to protect them from cruel and unusual punishment.361
In the Atkins holding, the Supreme Court of the United States intended to
provide a categorical protection to those with intellectual disability by
providing exemption from the death penalty that is now challenged by the
changing diagnostic criteria of intellectual disability.362 With this new
update to the diagnostic criteria of intellectual disability and the already
existing discrepancies amongst the states, confusion is inevitable and the
need for a uniform definition is even clearer.363
A.

Possible Solutions

In cases where the court is unclear as to whether or not a defendant
has an intellectual disability, the court should revisit the deciding factors in
the Atkins holding.364 The court should consider the goals of capital
punishment—deterrence and retribution—and whether they will in fact be
furthered by the death of the defendant.365 In the end, “the court[] must
conclude both that the defendant was more morally culpable than the average
criminal and that the rationale behind the death penalty applies”
appropriately to justify the most severe punishment in the country.366 In
357.
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360.
361.
362.
U.S. at 321.
363.
364.
365.
366.
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addition, the states may just want to consider revising their legislation to
include the updated diagnostic criteria.367 Each state still has the ability to
determine the definition used to make their legislation to categorically
exempt intellectually disabled defendants.368 By making a revision, the court
can be assured that they will properly determine if the death penalty is
appropriate when faced with an Atkins case.369 Going back to the original
decision may help courts make a more appropriate decision.370
Another seemingly simple solution, however, would be to implement
a uniform national standard.371 A countrywide standard would eliminate the
state-to-state discrepancies.372 The new standard should be made in
accordance with the current psychological definition and diagnostic criteria
in the DSM-5 as well as the Atkins decision.373 In addition to eliminating the
confusion created by having multiple definitions, the standard should also
include procedural information such as when this determination should be
made, as well as whether the judge, jury, or both should make it.374 This
would prevent the possibility of different holdings for the same person
depending on which state their trial was held in.375 By embracing the new
edition of the DSM and finally creating a uniform way to enforce the Atkins
holding, those that the Atkins decision intended to protect are more likely to
be spared from execution.376
V.

CONCLUSION

In 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States made a
groundbreaking decision in Atkins v. Virginia and their decision created a
categorical exemption for mentally retarded offenders.377 However, their
lack of a uniform standard or specific guidance for the states regarding a
definition of mental retardation led the states to make their own decision
regarding legislation.378 Many states relied upon the DSM-IV-TR definition
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